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Tanzania is well placed to receive a significant increase 
in aid inflows in coming years. Despite the potential for 
the additional aid inflows to raise income levels in the 
country, increasing them may bring about structural 
changes in the economy that may be unwelcome. One 
such change is an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
that leads to a contraction of traditional export sectors 
and a loss of export competitiveness. This paper employs 
a reduced-form equilibrium real exchange rate approach 
to explain movements in Tanzania’s real effective 
exchange in recent decades. Particular attention is paid to 
the relationship between aid inflows and the real effective 
exchange rate. The authors find that the long-run 
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behavior of the real effective exchange rate is influenced 
by terms of trade movements, the government’s trade 
liberalization efforts, and aid inflows. Positive terms-of-
trade movements are associated with an appreciation, 
periods of improving trade liberalization are associated 
with a depreciation, and increases in aid inflows are 
associated with a depreciation in the real effective 
exchange rate. Although the last result is non-standard, 
it is not empirically unique and does have theoretical 
underpinnings. A detailed analysis of this relationship 
over the last decade shows that the Bank of Tanzania’s 
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The international donor community is being encouraged to deliver on its 
commitments to scale up its official development assistance (ODA) in low income 
countries (LICs). The G-8 Summit in Gleneagles agreed that the G-8 group of countries 
and other donors would increase ODA to Africa by US$25 billion per year by 2010, 
which would represent a doubling of aid to Africa compared to 2004 levels. While aid to 
Sub-Saharan Africa has risen, the rate of increase is well short of that needed to achieve 
the Gleneagles commitments (World Bank 2007). Within Sub-Saharan Africa, aid 
inflows have and are expected to continue to be channeled to relatively well governed, 
good performing countries. With recent average annual real GDP growth of 6.0 percent 
(2000-06) and governance indicators that are improving relative to its neighbors, 
Tanzania has received a large fraction of aid inflows to Africa and may well receive a 
significant increase in coming years. 
Despite the potential for additional aid inflows to raise income levels in Tanzania, 
increasing aid inflows may bring about structural changes in the economy that may be 
unwelcome. One such change is an appreciation of the real exchange rate that leads to a 
contraction of traditional export sectors and a loss of export competitiveness. A real 
effective exchange rate (REER) index is often monitored to detect possible changes in 
international competitiveness and is used to inform monetary and exchange rate policy, 
especially in times of aid surges. Unless the underlying causes for movements in an 
REER index are satisfactorily understood conclusions regarding changes in 
competitiveness based simply on appreciations or depreciations of the REER are 
incomplete. 
 
This paper will examine how the REER has responded to internal and external 
macroeconomic developments over recent decades and pay particular attention to the 
relationship between aid inflows and the REER. We find that the long-run behavior of the 
REER is influenced by terms of trade movements, the government’s trade liberalization 
efforts and aid inflows. Positive terms-of-trade movements are associated with an 
appreciation of the REER, periods of improving trade liberalization are associated with a 
depreciation of the REER, while increases in aid inflows are associated with a 
depreciation in the REER. While the last result is non-standard, it is not empirically 
unique and does have theoretical underpinnings. A detailed analysis of this relationship 
over the last decade shows that the Bank of Tanzania’s response to aid inflows is likely 
the main reason for the finding.  
 
  2I. Measuring the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
 
In a small-open economy the real exchange rate may be its most important 
relative price measure and can be used as a key indicator of the economy’s external 
competitiveness. There are numerous ways to measure the real exchange rate and the 
choice of measure depends on the analytic question under investigation and data 
availability to empirically measure it. The analytic framework used to derive the real 
exchange rate in this paper is the two-sector dependent economy framework developed 
by Salter (1959) and Swan (1960). In this framework the relative domestic price of non-
traded to traded goods within the country is the real exchange rate. It is the relative price 
that achieves internal balance in the domestic supply and demand of nontraded and traded 
goods and captures the internal relative price incentives in an economy for producing or 
consuming tradable or nontradable goods (Hinkle and Nsengiyumva 1999). This measure 
has particular appeal in the low-income country (LIC) context and has been widely used 
in empirical real exchange rate studies (e.g. Van Wijnbergen (1985), Edwards (1989) and 
Elbadawi and Soto (2005)).  
 
In principle, the domestic price indices of tradables and nontradables should be used 
to construct the internal RER, but these series are typically not available in LICs. In 
practice, the internal real exchange rate is measured using the foreign WPI and the 
domestic CPI. The foreign WPI multiplied by the nominal exchange rate proxies the 
home country’s tradable goods price, while the domestic CPI is a proxy for nontradable 
prices in the home economy.
 2 A key drawback in using the CPI as a proxy for 
nontradables prices is that the greater the weight of traded goods in the CPI implies a 
greater divergence in the proxy to nontraded goods prices. An important drawback in 
using foreign WPI is that it is unlikely to track fluctuations in a LIC’s exports prices, 
especially commodity prices. It may, however, do better tracking import prices and 
nontraditional exports. One alternative is to calculate a domestic tradables price index by 
taking a weighted average of the foreign price of importables ( ) and exportables 




     
                                                 
2 One direct measure includes using expenditure data from nation accounts to measure the ratio of domestic 
prices of goods actually exported and imported and the price of domestically produced and consumed 
goods (Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson 1993). Another direct measure attempts to split sectors of 
production into tradable and nontradable categories and then calculate implicit price deflators.  
3 This measure of the internal real exchange rate implicitly assumes that import prices and export prices 
move together so that they can be aggregated into one tradable goods price. If the price of imports and 
export diverge then the measure will be less likely to appropriately capture the price incentives of 
producing or consuming tradables. In this case, it may be more appropriate to consider separate internal 
RER indices, one using exports prices and the other using import prices. In this way, the incentives in the 
exportable or the import-substituting sectors are better represented by the separate indices.  
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where  is units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency,   and  are 
price indices of importables and exportables respectively,  is domestic 
nontradables price index, and α is the share of importables in total tradables. 
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In the sections that follow the internal real exchange rate is measured using foreign 
wholesale price indices to proxy tradable prices and Tanzanian CPI index to proxy 
nontradables. We choose this measure for two reasons. The first is data availability and 
the second is that a careful analysis of the various measures of the REER showed that all 
suitable candidates were very strongly correlated over the sample and the empirical 
results that follow are not sensitive to various measures (Figure1 and Annex 1). We did, 
however, augment our preferred measure to allow for the parallel nominal exchange rate. 
 
Figure 1. Tanzania: Real Effective Exchange Rate Measures  
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Many LICs either 
have had or still have 
parallel markets for 
foreign exchange,  
where an exchange rate 
determined by the 
market (either legally 
or illegally) coexists 
with a pegged or 
managed exchange 
rate. Using the 
officially managed 
nominal exchange rate 
only in the calculation 
of an REER could be a misleading indicator of economy-wide price incentives in the LIC 
as the official rate is most times overvalued. Tanzania has had a parallel exchange rate for 
much of it post-independence history, with the parallel exchange premium peaking at 
Figure 2. Tanzania Parallel Market Premium 







































USD/TZA Shilling Parallel Market Rate Parallel Premium
Source: IFS and Pick’s currency yearbook 
  4over 700 percent in 1986. The parallel premium gradually declined to less than 10 
percent 1993 and the exchange rates were unified in 1994 (see Figure 2). In the next 
section, empirical results using an REER using a weighted average of the parallel and 
official nominal exchange rates are presented.
4   
  
A final consideration in the construction of an REER index is the choice of a 
weighting scheme. Moving beyond a two-country framework necessitates consideration 
of the range of trading partners to include in the real exchange rate index and how they 
should be weighted. There are two key issues that must be addressed when choosing a 
weighting scheme. The first is choosing the appropriate weights, either export weights, 
import weights, or both. We use export and imports or total trade flows as weights given 
that external competitiveness consists of both export and import competitiveness. The 
second issue concerns the choice between fixed or flexible weights over time. As trading 
patterns change over time, a real exchange rate index using fixed weights may provide a 
misleading picture of the net effect of movements in particular bilateral exchange rates, 
and thereby competitiveness. We use flexible weights as Tanzania’s trading partners have 
changed quite significantly over time (Annex 1). However, using either fixed or flexible 
weights does not materially alter any of the results that follow.
5   
 
II. Explaining the Behavior of Tanzania’s Long-Run Equilibrium REER 
 
i)  The long-run equilibrium REER 
 
Tanzania’s REER has been characterized by dramatic swings in recent decades. 
The 40 percent appreciation over the 1990s and subsequent sharp depreciation since 
2000, are relatively modest movements compared to fluctuations in the 1980s. Even large 
movements in the REER provide only limited guidance on changes in Tanzania’s 
competitiveness. Understanding the underlying factors that explain the movements in the 
REER is necessary before conclusions on external competitiveness can be drawn. A 
depreciation of the REER may result from a decline in the terms-of-trade which would 
not signal a gain in competitiveness, but a restoration of it. Alternatively, an appreciation 
of the REER may be justified by productivity improvements in the tradables sector, 
which would not imply a loss of competitiveness. To understand if Tanzania’s 
competitiveness has improved or worsened relative to any point in time it first must be 
understood if its REER is overvalued or undervalued. To make statements about the 
degree of misalignment of the REER it is necessary to have an understanding of an 
equilibrium value of the REER. It is appreciations and depreciations of the REER relative 
to an equilibrium value that signal a loss or gain in Tanzanian competitiveness.  
 
A standard definition of the equilibrium value of the REER is the relative price of 
tradables to nontradables that is consistent with the dual objectives of internal and 
                                                 
4 Jorgensen and Paldam (1986) justify the use of an average of the two rates on the basis that misalignments 
in the parallel and official rates tend to be in opposite directions (the parallel rate being undervalued while 
the official rate is overvalued) and policy shocks such as large devaluations often move the rates in 
opposite directions.  
5 More detail on the weighting schemes can be found in Annex 1. 
  5external balance, given specific values of relevant macroeconomic variables that 
influence internal and external balance (Montiel 1999, Edwards 1989). Internal balance is 
when the nontradables market clears in the current and futures periods. External 
equilibrium is attained when the current account balance is compatible with long-run 
sustainable capital flows. Concretely, an equilibrium REER is an unobservable variable 
that would prevail from real macroeconomic factors acting upon foreign exchange 
markets without interruption. Because an equilibrium REER is unobservable it must 
estimated by identifying fundamental macroeconomic factors that are theoretically 
expected to act upon foreign exchange markets.  
 
Estimating the equilibrium REER as a function of macroeconomic variables that 
vary over time implies that the equilibrium REER changes over time. But, the function  
between the REER and the 
fundamentals is fixed over the 
time period of analysis. This 
approach is well supported 
theoretically (Edwards 
(1989), Montiel (1997) and 
Elbadawi (1990), (1994)) and 
is particularly relevant in a 
case where the REER is 
found to be nonstationary. 
Figure 3 displays the long-run 
component of Tanzania’s 
REER, which shows 
significant changes over the 
sample period. The aim of the 
next section is to identify the 
macroeconomic variables that explain these long-term movements. This reduced-form 
equilibrium real exchange rate approach is one of a number of complementary 
approaches that can be used to assess real exchange rates. Others include the 
macroeconomic balance approach, the external sustainability approach and in the LIC 
context, the PPP approach.
 6 IMF (2006) and Hinkle and Nsengiyumva (1999) compare 
and contrast the various methods for real exchange rate assessments.   



























REER (WPI-based) long-term trend (HP filtered)
Source: Authors’ Calculations 
 
ii)   Recent macroeconomic developments  
 
The recent macroeconomic history of Tanzania can be broadly grouped into three 
periods – 1970-1986, 1987-1995 and 1996-2005. The first period was marked by an 
increasing role of the state in the domestic economy and the pursuit of an import-
substituting strategy aimed at creating a new brand of African socialism. Donors were 
                                                 
6 This approach is common in LICs when data availability is an issue. It involves identifying a base year for 
which the economy under consideration is judged to be in both external and internal balance and choosing 
the REER that prevailed in that year as the estimate of the equilibrium REER. This approach implies that 
the equilibrium REER does not change over time and assumes that the values of fundamental 
macroeconomic variables that influence internal and external balance do not change over time. 
  6initially quite supportive of the inward looking reform program and aid flows reached 
almost 15 percent of GDP in 1979. During the early 1980s and leading to the 1986 
balance of payments crisis, macroeconomic conditions deteriorated sharply as a result of 
the unsustainable economic program and commodity price shocks. Prices for Tanzania 
main commodity exports – cotton, coffee and cloves – which made up about 57 percent 
of export revenues at the time, declined by almost 15 percent over the period 1979-87. 
Consequently, real GDP growth declined sharply, while consumer price inflation took off 
averaging over 30 percent annually. Large imbalances in the country’s fiscal and external 
accounts emerged. Responding to a balance of payments crises in 1986, the shilling was 
devalued by more than 50 percent. During the pre-crisis period aid inflows declined to 
just under 10 percent of GDP by 1985.  
 
The immediate post-crisis period was characterized by government attempts to 
open up the economy, liberalize the foreign exchange market and reduce the role of the 
state in the domestic economy. The reform program was supported by an IMF ESAF and 
a structural adjustment program with the Bank. These programs and other donor inflows 
drove aid inflows to a peak of 25 percent of GDP in 1992. From 1987 to 1991, real GDP 
growth averaged 4.6 percent and fiscal policy improved markedly despite falling 
commodity prices ( mainly coffee prices) and inflation remaining close to 30 percent. The 
foreign exchange market was liberalized and the premium on the shilling in the parallel 
market all but disappeared by 1993. However, structural reforms waned and commitment 
to macroeconomic stability diminished over the years 1992-1995. Lack of fiscal control 
and large scale tax exemptions implied that the earlier fiscal gains were rolled back. The 
emerging fiscal imbalances led authorities to increase customs duties to compensate for 
shortfalls in domestic tax revenues. In response, the IMF, the Bank and other donors cut 
back on flows, which once again declined to about 10 percent of GDP.  
 
The decade spanning 1996-2005 was marked by steady progress in implementing 
macroeconomic reforms, resulting in robust growth rates and a significant decline in 
inflation. The authorities signaled their renewed commitment to reform with the signing 
of another ESAF with the IMF in 1996. A premium was placed on macroeconomic 
stabilization, while a key component of the structural reform program was trade 
liberalization, especially in the agriculture sector (World Bank 2007, IMF 2005). The 
first half of this period was characterized by average annual real GDP growth of 4 
percent, while consumer price inflation fell from 27.4 percent to 6.0 percent. Prices for 
Tanzania’ key commodity exports rebounded and remained strong during this period as 
well. The second half of the decade was even more impressive, with annual average real 
GDP growth of 6.5 percent and inflation falling to 5 percent by 2005. Since 2000, the 
government’s commitment to macroeconomic and structural reform emphasizing the 
importance of restricting the role of the state in the economy has coincided with another 
surge in aid flows, with the aid-to-GDP ratio over 12 percent in recent years  
 
Tanzania’ recent economic history has been shaped in large part by donors’ 
response to its successive economic reform programs, each of which placed an emphasis 
on trade reforms.  As a primary commodity exporter, exogenous changes in the prices of 
its key commodity exports have also played an important role in its economic evolution. 
  7Given these broad features of Tanzania’s economic history we focus on aid, trade and the 
terms-of-trade as the key explanations of the long-run behavior of real effective exchange 
rate. These three factors are standard among the macroeconomic economic fundamentals 
cited in the literature as determinants of REERs in LICs.  The next section explains the 
relationship between each of these factors, among others, and Tanzania’s real effective 
exchange rate.  
 
iii)  Possible factors affecting the long –run equilibrium REER  
 
Terms of trade  
 
Tanzania’s export revenues are heavily dependant on international commodity 
prices. On average, well over half of its export earnings over the last thirty years have 
been comprised of primary commodities – coffee, tobacco and cotton being the most 
important. While the principal commodity exports have changed over time, it remains a 
primary commodity exporter. Revenues from Tanzania’s top three commodity exports – 
fish, coffee, and cashew nuts, - accounted for 31% of non-gold exports in 2005. 
International commodity prices are volatile and when they change relative to Tanzanian 
import prices the equilibrium path of the REER will be affected. An increase in the 
international price for Tanzania’s commodity exports will increase real incomes in the 
export sector, resulting in an increase in the demand for nontraded goods. An 
appreciation of the REER will follow unless there is a substitution effect from domestic 
goods to foreign goods, in which case the REER may depreciate.    
 
Following Cashin et al (2002) we use a measure of Tanzania’s real commodity 
prices as a proxy for its terms of 
trade. The index is a geometric 
weighted average of Tanzania’s 
nine largest commodity export 
prices deflated by the World 
Bank’s index of manufactured 
exports (MUV).
7 In principal, 
the price of all exports rather 
than simply commodity exports, 
over the price of all imports, 
rather than a generic industrial 
country export deflator, should 
be used to measure terms of 
trade. However, concerns about 
the data quality and the 
































































WPI-based REER Real Commodity Price (2000=100)
Source: Authors’ calculation 
                                                 
7 The index is a weighted average of export prices of manufactured goods for the G-5 economies (the 
United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom), which is generally accepted as proxy of 
price index of developing country manufacture imports.We augment the measure to incorporate oil prices 
in the measure, as oil imports make up about 17% of Tanzanian imports in 2000s on average. 
  8availability of Tanzania’s export and import prices make the real commodity price index 
our preferred measure of Tanzania’s ToT.
8 Like many other African countries, Tanzania 
has experienced a secular decline in their terms of trade 
over the sample period, which broadly corresponds to the long-term trend decline in the 




Tanzania has received large and sustained aid flows for much of the last thirty 
years. Even when aid inflows decreased in the early 1980s, Tanzania received higher aid 
inlfows than most SSA countries (Ndulu and Mwase 2005). Following the reformist 
government’s move to market-base economy in 1985, aid flows surged to over 25 percent 
of GDP by 1992. When commitment to further economic reform weakened in the early to 
mid-1990s, aid flows again declined, but remained higher than most other SSA countries 
at almost 10 percent of GDP (Muganda 2004). Since 2000, the government’s 
commitment to macroeconomic and structural reform emphasizing the importance of 
restricting the role of the state in the economy has coincided with another surge in aid 
flows, with the aid-to-GDP ratio over 12 percent in recent years (IMF 2005).  
 
Aid inflows that are spent in the local economy will contribute to an increase in 
the demand for both tradables 
and nontradables.
9 When 
tradable goods’ prices are fixed 
by international prices it is 
nontradables prices that would 
tend to increase. The pressure 
of expanded liquidity on 
domestic demand and prices of 
nontraded goods would lead to 
a real exchange rate 
appreciation. Figure 5 indicates 
that no such relationship 
appears to be present in 
Tanzania. In fact, the series are 
highly negatively correlated, 
i.e. a depreciation 
(appreciation) of the REER is associated with an increase (decline) in aid flows. 















































Aid (% of GDP) WPI-based REER
 
Source: OECD DAC and authors’ calculations 
 
The ‘equilibrium’ relationship described could be muted or nonexistent for a 
number of reasons. There may be no change in the REER if aid is spent entirely on 
imports, implying no impact on money supply or aggregate demand in the local 
                                                 
8 The correlation coefficient between the real commodity price index and the ratio of Tanzania’s export and 
import prices taken from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database is 0.84 over the period 1980 
to 2004. 
9 To make local purchases, foreign exchange would need to be converted into local currency that would 
expand the money base, fuelling the increase in demand. 
  9economy. Alternatively, if the economy receiving the inflow is characterized by 
unemployed resources then the increase in demand generated by the aid inflow may not 
lead to an increase in nontradable prices. Import purchases and unemployed resources 
can explain why there may be a muted or no response in the REER to an aid surge, but 
they do not explain the observed negative relationship in Tanzania. There are numerous 
theoretical explanations for this relationship, but a proper multivariate framework that 
accounts for the nonstationarity of these series and controls for other factors is necessary 





Economic reforms introduced by the Tanzanian authorities from 1986 included a 
move away from the policies of import substitution undertaken in the 1970s. During 
1980-86, nontariff barriers covered more than 50 percent of imports, and the average 
simple tariff rate was about 40 percent. By 1999, nontariff barriers were largely confined 
to restrictions on imports of petroleum products and the simple tariff rate was between 15 
and 20 percent (Kanaan 2000). During the 1990s, the marketing and export of traditional 
export crops was decontrolled and the commercial role of the parastatal crop authorities 
was scaled back, resulting in the increase in the producer prices of food. The system of 
export and import licensing was abolished and the requirement of registration of 
exporting companies eliminate by 1994. The maximum tariff rate has been lowered and 
the number of tariffs has been reduced from six to three. Moreover, import surcharges 
imposed in 2001 on imports from other East African countries were gradually reduced or 
eliminated (IMF 2005).   
 
Trade liberalization can have an important impact on the long-run ‘equilibrium’ 
REER. The lowering of 
import tariffs, for example, 
will decrease the domestic 
price of imported goods 
increasing the demand for 
imports and the volume for 
imports. At the same time 
(assuming perfect 
substitutability) a decrease in 
demand for nontradables will 
result. In equilibrium, the 
price of nontradables will 
decrease resulting in a 
depreciation of the real 
exchange rate. The ratio of 
total trade to GDP is a commonly used measure of trade liberalization as it captures the 
assumption that a more liberal trade regime means higher trade volumes. Figure 6 
presents this measure of trade liberalization and Tanzania’s REER. As expected, there 
appears to be a strong inverse relationship between the series for the entire sample, 
















































Trade (% of GDP) WPI-based REER
 
Source: IFS and authors’ calculations 
  10implying that trade liberalizing reforms have contributed to periods of REER 
depreciation.  
 
Relative productivity differentials 
 
Perhaps the best known explanation for the behavior of long-run ‘equilibrium’ 
exchange rates is relative productivity differentials, the so-called Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. The Balassa-Samuelson effect rests on the assumption that productivity gains in 
the tradables goods sector are greater than productivity gains in the nontradables sector. 
The effect can be understood to work both within and across countries, with the same 
resulting impact on the real exchange rate. Within a country, an increase in productivity 
in the traded goods sector will lead to an increase in wages in both the tradable and 
nontradable sectors. Consequently, there is an increase in nontradables prices and an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. If PPP in tradable goods holds across countries, 
stronger productivity gains in the tradables sector in one country relative to another 
implies a stronger increase in the relative price of nontradables. The result is an 
appreciating real exchange rate for the country with the higher relative productivity gain.  
 
A striking feature of the Tanzania growth experience over the last thirty years is 
that it appears to be 
uncorrelated with the 
investment rate (World 
Bank 2002). Indeed, 
several periods were 
characterized by high 
investment rates and low 
growth, implying 
declining productivity of 
investment. Devarajan, 
Easterly and Pack 1999, 
note that value added per 
worker in the 
manufacturing 
experienced a sustained 
decline between 1975 and 
1990. Poor productivity 
performance relative to i
trend decline in Tanzania’s REER (Figure 7).  However, recent reforms aimed at 
increasing efficiency and investment appear to be bearing fruit as relative productivity i
Tanzania appears to have halted its long-term decline.
ts key trading partners is consistent with the observed long-term 
n 
                                                
10  
 
































































WPI-based REER Relative Productivity
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
10 There are a number of measures that proxy relative productivity, but due to data limitations we use the 
ratio of real GDP per capita in the seven largest trading partners to real GDP per capita in Tanzania. An 
area for further work would be to develop some measures for productivity in different sectors of the 
economy to proxy the relative productivity growth differentials between tradables and nontradables within 
Tanzania. 
  11Government expenditures 
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Figure 8. Public Investment and Real Effective 
 
The final factor that we consider to explain movements in the long-run 
rium REER is a change in the level of government expenditures. An incr
spending on traded goods generates an increase in demand for imports that results in a 
trade deficit, requiring a real exchange rate depreciation to maintain external balance. In
the LIC context, an increase in government investment is likely to capture spending on 
tradables.  Alternatively, an increase in government spending on nontradables is likely 
captured by consumption expenditures, which is expected to generate an increase in the
relative price of nontradables. If the increase in government spending is financed by 
government borrowing that require subsequent tax increases to finance, aggregate 
demand may be muted relative to the initial increase. It is the allocation of governm
expenditure across sectors in the economy is a fundamental determinant of the long-run 
equilibrium real exchange rate, not unsustainable fiscal policy financed by excessive 
credit creation. The latter can cause a short-run deviation from the long-run equilibriu
real exchange rate, i.e. a misalignment, but it is not considered a driver of the long-run 
equilibrium exchange rate.  
 
P
uting to rapid GDP 
growth (World Bank 
2006).  Importantly, th




the high import content of
public investment, a rise 
in the share of investment
in aggregate spending is a 
good proxy for a shift in 
public spending to 
tradable goods. Thi
compositional shift is
consistent with the rece
depreciation of the REER 
(Figure 8). Tanzania’s 
budget is heavily financ
(e.g. 40 percent in 2004) which makes it particularly difficult to disentangle the 
individual contribution of both aid inflows and government expenditures to move
in the REER in the same empirical specification.  The issue of multicollinearity, which is
not only limited to the aid and government expenditure variables, is addressed in the next 
section.  































































Public Investment (% of GDP) WPI-based REER
 
Source: World Bank WDI and reports 
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III. An Empirical Specification of Tanzania’s Long-Run Equilibrium REER 
 
This section presents the results of an estimated model of Tanzania’s long-run 
equilibrium REER (EREER). It is the first step in a two-step procedure that aims to 
distinguish between movements in the REER that are consistent with persistent 
movements in economic variables that affect the REER and temporary movements in the 
REER that may be explained by short-lived events like monetary policy. This approach 
will allow the estimation of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, the degree of 
misalignment of the actual REER relative to the estimated equilibrium value, and the 
estimated speed of the actual REER’s adjustment to equilibrium. An error-correction 
model is employed to achieve these results. We use a modified version of Engle and 
Granger’s (1987) two-stage error-correction procedure to estimate the long-run 
relationship between the EREER and its fundamentals and the short-term dynamics 
affecting the REER.  
 
The first stage of Engle and Granger (1987) involves estimating a cointegrating 
relationship by OLS. We modify this stage by estimating the cointegrating relationship 
using Phillips and Hansen’s (1990) Fully Modified (FM) method. Although the OLS 
estimators are consistent and highly efficient, they are biased in small samples making 
inference based on parameter estimates unreliable. The Phillips and Hansen (1990) FM 
estimator applies a semi-parametric modification to the standard OLS procedure that 
corrects for autocorrelation of the OLS residuals as well as endogeneity of the regressors. 
The result is parameter estimates that are asymptotically optimal, making inference more 
reliable. There are alternative approaches to achieving reliable parameters estimates, such 
as Johansen’s (1995) maximum likelihood estimator using a vector error-correction 
mechanism specification, but it requires more data observations than are available in the 
present analysis to be effectively implemented. We present the results of both OLS and 
FM-OLS methods below.  
 
The first step in the first stage of Engle and Granger (1987) is to determine the 
order of integration of the variables, which identifies if the chosen variables are non-
stationary. Annex 3 Table 1 presents the results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
for unit roots and the Phillips- Perron test, which shows that all variables are 
nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences, i.e. integrated of the first order 
I(1), over the entire sample period 1970-2005. The results support the notion that the 
series are integrated processes that can be exploited to uncover a long-run equilibrium 
relationship.  
  13i) Cointegration results  
 
The following model is estimated by OLS and Phillips and Hansen’s (1990) FM-
OLS over the period 1970-2005:  
 
t t t t t t AID od INV TRADE TOT REER ε β β β β β β + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 Pr   
 
REER is the real effective exchange rate as measured as the nominal effective 
exchange rate multiplied by the ratio of foreign wholesale prices to Tanzanian CPI. A 
variety of measures of the REER (see Section II) including a measure that incorporates 
the parallel exchange rate will be used to test the robustness of the results. TOT is the 
terms of trade measured as Tanzania’s real commodity price index. AID is net aid 
inflows taken from the OECD’s DAC database.
11 We also include net private capital 
flows in the measure to capture total public and private capital inflows. Trade is a 
measure of trade liberalization and is proxied by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
PROD is a relative productivity measure aiming to capture Balassa-Samuelson effects 
and is measured as the ratio of real GDP per capita in Tanzania relative to its major 
trading partners. INV is government investment expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
 
ADF tests indicate that the error term in our OLS regressions is stationary, 
indicating that there is a long-run cointegrating relationship between the REER and the 
fundamental macroeconomic variables chosen (Table 1). The preliminary results suggest 
that the terms of trade, aid and trade liberalization are strongly significant determinants of 
Tanzania’s long-run equilibrium exchange rate (Table 1, column (1)). The sign of the 
parameter estimate on the government investment variable is not as expected, although it 
is insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficient on the relative productivity 
measure is also insignificant, but this is likely the result of measurement error. It is also 
the case that the relative productivity measure is highly correlated with the terms of trade 
measure. We ran the specification alternately excluding the relative productively measure 
and the terms of trade measure and found that by excluding the ToT measure the relative 
productivity measure remained insignificant. On the basis of this result we dropped the 
relative productivity measure from the specification.
12  
 
Dropping both the investment and the relative productivity measures from the 
original specification does not significantly alter the parameter estimates on the 
remaining variables or the overall goodness of fit of the model. Column 2 reports the 
results of the more parsimonious specification. This specification was re-run using the 
parallel nominal exchange rate in the REER index.
 13 The signs and the significance of 
                                                 
11 The debt relief component of this measure is adjusted to better reflect the annual cash flow of HIPC debt 
relief which purges the DAC’s measure of the possible over recording of debt relief in a single year due to 
the practice of some DAC reporting creditors to record debt relief as stock of debt reduction operation 
rather than a flow of debt service reduction. 
12 Better proxies for relative productivity differentials in the tradable and nontradables sectors are required 
before further testing on this variable can be undertaken. 
13 The parallel nominal exchange rate is incorporated into the REER by taking a weighted average of the 
official and parallel rates by assuming that the share of transactions in the parallel market is 80 percent 
when parallel premium is highest and the share of parallel market trade decline proportionally with (square 
  14each of the variables remain unchanged. The parameter estimates on the terms-of-trade 
and the trade liberalization variables decline, while the estimate on the aid inflows 
variable increases somewhat. A similar pattern is observed with the FM-OLS estimators.  
 


















































Log (Invest)  0.11 
(0.15) 
      
Log (PROD)  -0.00 
(0.48) 
      
























No.  of  obs  36  36 36 36 31  36 
Adjusted R
2 0.77 0.77  0.80       
D-W Stat.  1.23  1.22  1.97       
Residual ADF 
test  
-3.92 -3.89  -5.74       
LC ( P-value)        0.09  >=0.20  0.11 
MeanF (P-
value) 
     <=0.01  0.09  <=0.01 
SupF (P-
value) 
     <=0.01  <=0.01  <=0.01 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.  
1/ REER is calculated incorporating parallel exchange rate. The share of parallel varies with the size of 
parallel market premium. 
 
  A key result is that the inverse relationship between aid inflows and the REER 
observed in the bivariate context holds in the multivariate specification. The statistically 
significant inverse relationship between aid inflows and the equilibrium REER is 
somewhat unexpected, but the finding is not unique (Nyoni 1997: Tanzania, Ogun 1995: 
Nigeria, Sackey 2001: Ghana, Ouattara and Strobl: CFA Franc Zone). Nevertheless, we 
think this relationship deserves careful consideration before any policy conclusions are 
drawn. We consider three possible avenues that may be leading to a spurious relationship 
between aid inflows and Tanzania’s REER. The first is multicollinearity between aid 
flows and our measure of trade liberalization. The second is that the specification may 
not be adequately capturing the possibility that the aid inflows generate positive supply 
side responses in the economy that may overwhelm the expected demand side effects. 
                                                                                                                                                 
root of) parallel premium. While somewhat arbitrary, this definition does reflect discussions with Bank of 
Tanzania officials.  
  15The third is that our results may be unduly influenced by the period in the run-up to and 
including the balance of payments crisis in 1986. We address each in turn below. 
 
ii)  Robustness checks  
 
The openness proxy used to capture trade liberalization and the aid inflows variable 
are highly correlated over the 1980-2004 period (correlation coefficient 0.79), possibly 
suggesting that trade liberalization efforts in Tanzania have been rewarded with higher 
aid inflows. Mwase and Ndulu (2005) state that, “Tanzania’s evolving relationship with 
donors illustrates the endogeneity of the perceived state of the policy environment to the 
prevailing global development paradigm.” For much of our sample, the prevailing global 
development paradigm had trade liberalization as a key component. To see if our results 
were being affected by this relationship we ran a separate bivariate regression of trade 
liberalization on aid inflows and put the residuals from this regression in the general 
specification. This instrumental variable represents an aid inflows measure purged of any 
trade liberalization influence.
14 The parameter estimates on both the aid inflows and the 
trade liberalization variables are virtually unchanged.
15 
 
  The inclusion of the government investment spending directly in the specification 
is one way of capturing the notion that aid flows could be generating positive supply-side 
responses in the economy that are deflationary. Including the investment spending 
measure should reduce the amount of variation in the REER that is explained by the aid 
inflows variable and attribute it to the investment spending variable.
 16 However, the 
results above indicate that public investment spending is not a significant determinant of 
the REER. Alternatively, we test if the negative relationship between aid inflows and the 
REER may be working through indirect channels. We include a measure in the general 
specification that interacts aid inflows with an estimate of Tanzania’s output gap. An 
equilibrium real exchange rate appreciation would only be expected when the economy is 
running close to, at or above capacity in the presence of high and rising aid inflows.
17 
The results of including the interaction term (not shown) indicate that its parameter 
estimate is not significant at conventional levels and its inclusion in the baseline 
specification does not affect the parameter estimates of either the aid inflows variable o
the others in th
r 
e specification. 
                                                
 
We re-ran the parsimonious specification with a structural break to be confident that 
the results are not being influenced by the balance of payments crisis in 1986 when the 
devaluation of the shilling coincided with a surge in aid inflows.  Chow test results 
indicate that a structural difference exists in the parameter estimates between the periods 
1986-90 and the rest of the sample.  Column 5 in Table 1 shows the parameter estimates 
when the data points over the period 1986-90 are excluded from the sample. The results 
 
14 Ganger-causality tests show that trade liberalization Granger-causes aid inflows and not vis versa.  
15  Simply adding more data can also rid the specification of this multicollinearity, which is confirmed by 
the results of expanding the dataset back to 1970.   
16 Also, investment spending is a strong proxy for government spending on tradables, which could result in 
a decrease in the relative price of nontradables and therefore REER depreciation. 
17 See Mwanza 2004 for an analytic framework that relaxes some standard assumptions of the core “Dutch 
Disease” model to illustrate this point. 
  16are virtually unchanged, giving some assurance that the relationship between aid inflows 
and the REER is not being driven by the 1986 crisis.
18 Lastly, we estimated the 
specification incorporating the parallel exchange rate into the REER measure. The signs 
of the coefficients do not change and all three variables remain highly significant. 
However, the coefficients on the terms of trade and the trade liberalization variables 
decline somewhat.  
 
iii)  Elasticity estimates 
 
The results from the FM-OLS (with a structural break) estimation are preferred when 
interpreting the elasticities given by the long-run parameter estimates (Column 5). Given 
the uncertainty surrounding the correct incorporation of the parallel nominal exchange 
rate in the REER measure we present the elasticities as ranges. On the basis of these 
results, the long-run relationship between Tanzania’s REER and its terms of trade, net aid 
inflows and trade liberalization can be identified as follows: 
 
•  The terms of trade parameter estimates suggests that a 1 percent increase in 
Tanzania’s terms of trade leads to an approximately 0.3 to 0.8 percent increase in 
the REER. This positive relationship suggests that the income effect of terms of 
trade increase dominates the substitution effect.  
 
•  The parameter estimate on the aid variable indicates that 1 percent increase in aid 
inflows (as a share of GDP) is associated with a 0.3 to 0.5 percent depreciation of 
the equilibrium REER. 
 
•  The parameter estimate on the openness proxy capturing trade liberalization  
suggests that an improvement in trade liberalization captured by a 1 percent 
increase in Tanzania’s trade to GDP ratio will result in a 0.6 to 1.0 percent 
depreciation of the equilibrium REER. 
 
To be confident in the interpretation of the long-run elasticities it is important that the 
parameter estimates are stable over the sample period. We test for parameter stability 
using the Lc and MeanF tests proposed by Hansen (1992). Both tests have the same null 
hypothesis of parameter stability. The results indicate that we can not reject the null 
hypothesis of parameter stability over the sample period at all conventional significance 
levels.  
 
iv)  Possible explanations for the Aid-REER relationship 
 
There is a growing body of theoretical research that shows an REER depreciation in 
the presence of increasing aid inflows.  A number of models focus on supply-side 
impacts of aid inflows. They suggest that aid inflows may induce a rapid supply-side 
                                                 
18 As an additional check, we re-ran a similar parsimonious specification on a quarterly dataset beginning in 
the first quarter of 1998 and the aid inflows REER relationship remained unchanged. Although, the aid 
inflow variable and the trade liberalization variable are defined differently than in the annual dataset, so the 
results are not directly comparable.  
  17response in the economy that more than offsets the demand responses. Similarly, aid that 
is targeted at easing supply bottlenecks in the economy could have a deflationary impact 
that could dominate the upward pressure on the price of nontradables due to the initial aid 
inflow (Hjertholm, Laursen and White 1999).
19 Such a situation may well describe 
circumstances in Tanzania, particularly in the years following 1986 when the 
underground economy resurfaced generating a large supply response to the increased 
availability of goods (Mwase and Ndulu 2005). 
 
Adam and Bevan (2003) develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that 
simulates the impacts of a permanent increase in aid-financed public infrastructure 
investment. Under a scenario where the increase in investment spending induces a 
productivity gain that is concentrated in the nontradables sectors and there is a high 
subsistence element in food consumption a depreciation of the real exchange rate results. 
Adam (2003) also presents evidence from a simulation exercise that shows a real 
exchange rate depreciation over the medium-term in response to aid inflows. It is less 
clear that productivity gains are at work to create the inverse relationship in Tanzania, 
given the secular decline in productivity over the last 30 years.  
 
  Devarajan et. al. (2007) present a CGE model that introduces explicitly the 
implications of intertemporal choices that attempt to smooth aid flows. Their model also 
includes the evolution of trade shares and elasticities to explore the impact of trade 
liberalization and globalization in the macroeconomic dynamics of scaled up aid.  The 
authors simulate an increase in foreign official grants by 2 percent of output permanently 
and find that dynamically optimal decisions in investment and consumption will result in 
a real exchange rate depreciation. For investment to increase in the face of aid inflows, 
the returns to the firm must improve. A real exchange rate depreciation is required to 
cause the forward depreciation of the real exchange rate and in turn increase the market 
discount rate affecting supply behavior. A depreciation also increases the demand-side 
discount-rate, postponing consumption immediately, but causing an increasing growth 
rate in consumption over time. Like standard CGE models, consumption, investment and 
output increase with aid inflows, but optimal intertemporal behavior on the part of 
consumers and producers requires real exchange rate depreciation in this model. Attempts 
to smooth aid inflows hold perhaps the most convincing argument for the inverse 
relationship between aid inflows and the REER found in Tanzania, especially in recent 
years. The final two sections of the paper explore this possibility in detail.  
 
Other possible explanations for the relationship include ‘tied’ aid and exchange rate 
regime changes. If a donor provides aid that is conditional upon the recipient country to 
import from that donor and the value of the imports is greater than the original aid inflow 
then the real exchange rate could depreciate.
 20 Lastly, donors may provide aid to support 
the change in an exchange rate regime, which in many cases would mean a strong 
                                                 
19 In this case, output would grow faster than money supply growth. 
20 This explanation is put forward by Nyoni 1998 when he finds a negative and significant relationship 
between aid flows and Tanzania’s REER. While this explanation may describe aid flows in the 1970s and 
1980s it is not clear that the same explanation is relevant for recent history. 
  18devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. 
21 The empirical results suggest that this last 
explanation is not driving the relationship in Tanzania, but the tie aid story holds some 
promise. In general, it is likely that a number of these factors are working together – tie 
aid, the easing of supply bottlenecks and aid inflow smoothing, - to produce the observed 
inverse relationship over the entire sample.  
 
v)  The estimated equilibrium REER and misalignment 
 
The long-run equilibrium relationship estimated above allows for the calculation 
of an annual estimate of Tanzania’s equilibrium REER (EREER). The estimated EREER 
is a function of the long-term or permanent components of the explanatory variables and 
the parameter estimates from the preferred specification in table 1 above. To get the 
permanent components of the explanatory variable we apply an HP filter to each series. It 
is also necessary to make a constant term adjustment to ensure that the sample period 
means of the estimated EREER and the actual REER are equal. Figure 9 shows the actual 
REER and the estimated EREER over the period 1970-2005. The EREER shows 
significant variations over the sample period, reflecting the changes in the structural 
conditions in Tanzania as well as significant changes in external factors like its terms of 
trade. Both the EREER and the actual REER move together quite closely over the period, 
but there are periods of significant and sustained deviations.  
 
Figure 9. Tanzania: Indices of Actual and Estimated Equilibrium REER and 
Misalignment (1970-2005) 
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The second panel in Figure 9 depicts the estimated degree of misalignment 
between the estimate EREER and the actual REER. Temporary changes in the 
explanatory variables in our long-run specification and other short-term factors like 
monetary policy explain divergences between the estimated EREER and the actual 
REER. The misalignment index coincides quite closely with what are generally 
considered periods of overvaluation and undervaluation of Tanzania’s real exchange rate. 
The REER was undervalued for much of the 1970s. A series of devaluations and price 
controls implemented by the National Price Commission meant that the REER 
                                                 
21 Devaluation policy should not affect the equilibrium real exchange rate over the long term, but it can 
exert an influence that can last for a significant period of time. 
  19depreciated by almost 30 percent over the decade. From 1980 the actual REER 
appreciated sharply in the run-up to the 1986 balance of payments crisis and was 
overvalued for much of this time, reaching a high of 55 percent in 1985. In the post-crises 
years 1988-1990 the index illustrates the typical over-shooting of the nominal exchange 
rate that occurs after crises episodes with the REER being undervalued for this period. 
From the mid- 1990s the REER has largely been close to equilibrium.  
 
IV. Short-term Dynamics of the REER: An Error Correction Model 
 
i) Short-term  dynamics   
 
Tanzania’s REER has exhibited significant fluctuations and some sustained 
deviations around the estimated equilibrium REER (Figure 9). The purpose of this 
section is to specify a model of the REER that captures short-term dynamics that explain 
movements around the long-term equilibrium REER, the second step in the Engle and 
Granger two-stage procedure. The existence of a long-term equilibrium value of the 
REER does not mean that the observed REER has to be permanently equal to the 
equilibrium value. The observed REER can display short-term, even medium-term 
deviations from equilibrium and may be driven by short-term changes in fundamentals or 
policy variables.  
 
Monetary and other policy variables may play a particularly import role in 
explaining REER movements in the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, where such 
policies must be consistent with the fixed rate regime. For example, excess domestic 
credit expansion will put pressure on domestic prices, resulting in a temporary real 
appreciation of the REER, or an REER misalignment. However, in the absence of a 
change in fundamentals to support excessive credit expansion there will be pressure to 
devalue the nominal exchange rate. Policy variables will also impact the REER under a 
flexible exchange rate regime if domestic prices and nominal exchange rates adjust to 
shocks at different speeds. The short-run specification below will attempt to isolate the 
short-term factors influences deviations around the long run EREER.  
 
Given Tanzania’s aid dependency over the sample we also consider more closely 
the policy reaction to aid inflows in the short-run specification. The central bank’s policy 
response to aid inflows that are spent domestically by the government may mitigate a real 
exchange rate appreciation in the short-run. The central bank may respond to aid inflows 
by selling foreign exchange to remove from circulation the increase in the money base 
spent by the government.
22. Another possibility is for the central bank to curtail inflation 
and real exchange rate appreciation by selling Treasury bills.
23 In this case, rising interest 
                                                 
22 Although, there would still be real exchange rate appreciation in this case due to the initial overall rising 
aggregate demand and an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate associated with the sale of foreign 
exchange.  
23 The sale of T-bills would reduce the money supply and raise domestic interest rates. 
  20rates and the reduction in the money supply mitigates rising inflation and aggregate 
demand, thereby muting REER appreciation.
24  
 
Alternatively, the government may decide to build up reserves in the central bank. 
The government may do this because it is concerned about potential loss of 
competitiveness or as form of insurance against future shortfalls in aid inflows. While the 
level of aid inflows to Tanzania has been relatively high over the entire sample period 
they have been subject to wide fluctuations. The average annual level of net aid inflows 
jumped from 10 percent of GDP over the 1970-86 period to 24 percent over the 1987-94 
period before falling to 15 percent over the 1995-2004 period. Moreover, annual aid 
disbursements have been unpredictable as donor commitments differ significantly from 
actual disbursements. One possible response to the volatility of aid inflows is for the 
central bank to build reserves during aid surges and draw down reserves when aid flows 
decline.
25 Such a strategy would tend to depreciate (appreciate) the nominal and, in the 
short run, the real exchange rate in the presence of on aid surge (decline), all else equal.  
 
Figure 10 shows 
the relationship between 
net aid inflows and 
reserve accumulation in 
Tanzania over our sample. 
There appears to be no 
relationship between the 
series until 1990, at which 
point changes in BoT 
reserves become highly 
correlated with net aid 
inflows (correlation 
coefficient 0.73). Since 
1995, reserve 
accumulation has been 
dramatic, increasing from 
1.5 months of imports to 6.5 months of imports in 2004. The reserve accumulation 
combined with significant unemployed resources in the economy may be explaining part 
of the negative relationship between aid inflows and the REER, especially in recent 
years. The short-run specification below will include changes in BoT reserves to capture 
this possible influence on the REER over the short-run.  
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ii)  Tanzania’s REER: An error correction model  
 
Stage two of Engle and Granger (1987) consists of running a short-run 
specification of the REER which includes changes in the key explanatory variables 
                                                 
24 If capital market is free from controls, rising domestic interest rates may actually attract international 
capital flows and appreciate the currency (IMF 2005). 
25 Improving tax revenues is also an option, but the ratio of tax revenues to GDP has been virtually constant 
over the last thirty years at less than 14 percent.  
  21identified in the long-run cointegrating relationship and other policy variables that are 
considered to influence the short-run dynamics of the REER. The key policy variables 
included in the model are excess credit (defined as the growth of base money in excess of 
nominal GDP growth) and the change in Bank of Tanzania reserves. It also includes the 
lagged residuals from the preferred long-run specification to capture the speed of 
adjustment of the REER to its equilibrium value (i.e. the error correction term). Table 2 
presents the results of the ECM, a number of which are worth highlighting: 
 
• The growth rate of aid inflows has a negative and significant short-run impact on 
the REER, echoing the result obtained in the long-run relationship.  
 
• The short-run impact of the trade liberalization proxy on the REER is also similar 
to the results obtained in the long-run specification. However, it appears that the 
short-run effects of changes in the TOT are insignificant. 
 
• Including changes in the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) reserves in the specification 
renders the aid variable insignificant, implying that BoT reserve policy in reaction 
to aid inflows may be an explanation for the inverse relationship between aid 
inflows and the REER in the short-run.  
 
The key parameter in the ECM is the error-correction term measuring the speed of 
adjustment of the actual REER to its equilibrium value. When a gap between the real 
exchange rate and its equilibrium value arises, the real exchange rate will tend to 
converge to its equilibrium value. Depending on the cause of the gap, the adjustment 
requires that the real exchange rate either moves progressively to a new equilibrium level, 
or returns from its temporary deviation to the original equilibrium value. The parameter 
estimate on the error-correction term suggests that it takes less than two years for a 
deviation in the REER to return halfway to its equilibrium level. This result is similar to 
the speed of adjustment estimates found in Edwards (1989), but is longer than the Baffes 
et al (1998) estimates found for Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast. The rather long half-
life of the return to equilibrium is likely influenced significantly by the apparent extended 
period of undervaluation during the 1970s. 
 
The ECM was re-run using the REER that incorporates the parallel nominal 
exchange rate. The results (Column 3 and 5) are generally similar to those found using 
the REER based on the official nominal exchange rate. An important difference is the 
estimated speed of adjustment to equilibrium. Incorporating the extra market information 
associated with the transactions in the parallel market indicates that the REER moves 
more quickly to equilibrium than the REER based only on the official nominal exchange 
rate. The estimated parameter on the error correction term implies that it takes roughly 
less than a year for the REER to return halfway to its equilibrium value. 























































Δ Log (Invest.)  0.03 
(0.12) 
     
Δ Log (Prod)  -0.76 
(0.63) 
     














No. of obs  35  35  35  35  35 
Adjusted R
2  0.35 0.37 0.52  0.42  0.70 
1/Independent variable incorporates parallel exchange rate. 
 
V.  The Policy Response to Aid Inflows  
 
  This section builds the ECM results in the previous section to focus specifically 
on the policy response to aid inflows over the period 1995-2005. We undertake an 
accounting exercise in the spirit of the IMF (2004) to look for additional evidence that the 
policy response to aid inflows helps explain the negative and significant relationship 
between the REER and net aid inflows over this period. When aid flows into Tanzania 
the authorities must decide whether it is to be used to finance expenditures or a tax  
reduction. Following the 
IMF (2004) the spending of 
aid is defined as the 
widening in the 
government’s fiscal deficit 
before aid that accompanies 
the increase in aid. The first 
thing to note about these 
series is that there has been a 
steady increase in the 
amount of net aid financing 
that is recorded in the budget 
(Annex 3 Table A4). This 
has the effect of showing up 
as a steady increase in net aid inflows in the fiscal accounts over the entire period 1995- 










94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05
Change in total expenditure
Change in development expenditure
Change in net aid
Source: IMF reports and authors’ calculations 
  232005. It is clear, however, that increases in net aid inflows are largely being spent in the 
economy as increases in net aid inflows are accompanied by a widening of the before aid 
fiscal deficit (Annex Table 2). A strong correlation between net aid inflows and fiscal 
expenditures is also apparent (Figure 11). This result is consistent with IMF (2004) which 
found that over 90 percent of incremental aid flowing into Tanzania was spent over the 
period 2000-05.  
 
It is the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy in response to aid 
inflows that determines the macroeconomic impact of aid, including the potential impact 
on the real exchange rate. Monetary policy can react to the spending of an increase in aid 
inflows in three ways. The Bank of Tanzania can allow the money supply to increase, 
aggregate demand to increase and the price of nontradables to increase, resulting in a real 
exchange rate appreciation. Alternatively, the BoT could sterilize the increase in the 
money supply by selling foreign exchange, again resulting in an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate.
26 Lastly, the BoT could opt to curtail inflation and real appreciation of the 
real exchange rate by selling treasury bills. 
 
The accounting evidence suggests that rather than selling foreign exchange to permit 
the increase in net imports that an aid increase allows, the BoT choose instead to build 
reserves in the face of increasing aid inflows. At the same time, it issued T-bills to 
sterilize the aid flows that were spent in the economy. The stock of liquidity paper (T-
bills) increased from 56 billion Tza shilling (less than one percent of GDP) in 1999 to 
454 billion Tza shillings (3.7 percent of GDP) by end-2004. The annual average nominal 
T-bill rate declined from 10 percent in 1999 to 3.5 percent in 2002 before climbing to 8.3 
percent in 2004. In this way, inflation was kept in check, while the policy of building 
reserves supported a nominal depreciation of the shilling over the entire period 1995-
2005.  
 
Table 3 is a summarized balance of payments presentation for Tanzania over the 
period 1995-2005. It isolates how much of the non-aid current account balance is covered 
by net aid inflows and how the change in gross reserves responds to net aid’s over- or 
under-coverage of the CA deficit. For example, in 2000 net aid inflows were $60 million 
greater than the recorded CA deficit, while the accumulation of reserves was $197 
million. This accounting suggests that the Bank of Tanzania did not sell the additional 
foreign exchange to finance additional net imports, but rather built up reserves in an 
amount that was greater than the excess aid inflow. Subsequent years over the period 
2000-2004 show a similar response. In 2001, net aid inflows actually fell short of 
covering the non-aid CA by $53 million, yet reserves were accumulated by an additional 
$186 million. Other thing being equal, this reaction would create pressure for a nominal 
depreciation, and in the short run, a real depreciation. The bottom panel of Table 3 shows 
                                                 
26 This response describes what the IMF (2004) calls the absorption of aid inflows. Absorption is defined as 
the extent to which the non-aid current account deficit widens in response to an increase in aid inflows. It 
aims to measure the quantity of net imports financed by an increase in aid, which represents the real 
resource transfer of resources enabled by aid (IMF 2004). Aid that is spent and not absorbed is similar to 
increasing government expenditures in the absence of aid. The difference is that international reserves are 
higher. 
  24the cumulative increase in each component over the entire period. The cumulative change 
in net aid inflows marginally exceeded the cumulative increase in the non aid current 
account ($91 million), while gross reserves were accumulated by over $1 billion.  
 
The accumulation of reserves in this amount over the period 2000-05 is consistent 
with a real exchange rate depreciation. However, the BoT’s reserve policy over the 1995-
1999 period is not consistent with the REER appreciation observed. Despite a period of 
accumulation of reserves ($ 0.4 billion) the REER appreciated sharply. The reserve 
policy is consistent, however, with the observed depreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate over this period. There are a number of reasons why the BoT may have wanted to 
increase reserves over this period. Over the period 2000-05, it could have been done as a 
response to a surge in aid inflows resulting from a concern about a potential loss of 
competitiveness or as form of insurance against future shortfalls in aid inflows. It is 
equally plausible that BoT aimed to build up reserves for prudential reasons and was a 
continuation of a trend that started in the mid-1990s. Gross reserves covered only 1.5 
months of imports in 1995 and were built up to 6.5 months of imports by end-2004. 
Regardless of the BoT’s motive for building reserves the effect was the same: it 




  25Table 3. Balance of Payments 1994-2005






Net aid flow 727.53 698.42 967.74 627.65 795.92 937.31 754.64 667.10 876.29 1140.26 1405.16
Non-aid current account balance -1008.64 -578.20 -784.88 -1230.33 -1194.69 -877.30 -808.26 -818.8 -795.1 -984.7 -1324.30
Change in Reserves (- = increase) 57.25 -209.45 -182.14 20.91 -175.41 -197.41 -186.38 -333.44 -348.16 -218.62 -128.49
Potenial REER Impact (-=expected 
depreciation) -223.86 -89.23 0.72 -581.77 -574.18 -137.41 -240.00 -485.12 -267.00 -63.10 -47.63
Non-aid capital account balance 1/ 223.86 89.23 -0.72 581.77 574.18 137.41 240.00 485.12 267.00 63.10 47.63
Percent of GDP
Net aid flow 13.84 10.75 12.59 7.49 9.21 10.32 7.99 6.83 8.52 10.08 11.60
Non-aid current account balance -19.19 -8.90 -10.21 -14.68 -13.83 -9.66 -8.56 -8.38 -7.73 -8.71 -10.93
Change in Reserves (- = increase) 1.09 -3.22 -2.37 0.25 -2.03 -2.17 -1.97 -3.41 -3.38 -1.93 -1.06
Potenial REER Impact (-=expected 
depreciation) -4.26 -1.37 0.01 -6.94 -6.65 -1.51 -2.54 -4.96 -2.59 -0.56 -0.39
Non-aid capital account balance 1/ 4.26 1.37 -0.01 6.94 6.65 1.51 2.54 4.96 2.59 0.56 -0.39
Cummulative Changes (millions US$)
Net aid flow 3817.26 5780.75
Non-aid current account balance -4796.74 -5608.50
Change in Reserves (- = increase) -488.84 -1412.50
Potenial REER Impact (-=expected 
depreciation) -1468.32 -1240.25
Non-aid capital account balance 1/ 1468.32 1240.25
Changes (millions US$)
∆ Net aid flow -29.11 269.32 -340.09 168.27 141.38 754.64 -270.21 121.65 473.16 528.87
∆ Non-aid current account balance 430.44 -206.68 -445.45 35.64 317.39 -808.26 58.52 13.13 -165.97 -529.17
∆ Change in Reserves (- = increase) -266.70 27.31 203.05 -196.33 -22.00 -186.38 -136.03 -161.78 114.82 219.67  
Potenial REER Impact (-=expected 
depreciation) 134.63 89.95 -582.49 7.59 436.77 -240.00 -347.71 -27.00 422.02 219.37
∆ Non-aid capital account balance 1/ -134.63 -89.95 582.49 -7.59 -436.77 240.00 347.71 27.00 -422.02 -219.37
Changes (% of GDP)
∆ Net aid flow -3.09 1.84 -5.11 1.73 1.11 7.99 -3.50 0.52 3.25 3.09
∆ Non-aid current account balance 10.29 -1.31 -4.46 0.85 4.17 -8.56 1.28 0.83 -0.33 -3.21
∆ Change in Reserves (- = increase) -4.31 0.85 2.62 -2.28 -0.14 -1.97 -1.24 -1.41 1.48 2.32  
Potenial REER Impact (-=expected 
depreciation) 2.89 1.38 -6.95 0.29 5.13 -2.54 -3.45 -0.05 4.41 2.20  
∆ Non-aid capital account balance 1/ -2.89 -1.38 6.95 -0.29 -5.13 2.54 3.45 0.05 -4.41 -2.99
Source: IMF Staff Reports.
1/ Includes errors and omissions.
2/ Original data available in fiscal year, converted to calendar year by taking average
1995-1999
Years of  REER Appreciation
1995-1999 2000-2005
Years of REER Depreciation
2000-2005 
 Conclusions   
 
This paper examined how Tanzania’s REER has responded to internal and external 
macroeconomic developments since 1970. A long-run cointegrating relationship was 
developed to explain the long-run relationship between the REER and fundamental 
macroeconomic variables. An error-correction specification was employed to better 
understand the short-run dynamics of Tanzania’s REER. As Tanzania appears to be a 
likely candidate to receive an increase in its already significant aid inflows, a special 
emphasis was placed on the relationship between the REER and aid inflows. A key 
conclusion of this work is that we can find no evidence that net aid inflows to 
Tanzania have led to an appreciation of the REER. Indeed, the evidence suggests that 
aid surges are associated with depreciations in the REER both in the short-run and the 
long-term. This result, while somewhat counterintuitive, is not unique. Moreover, there 
are plausible explanations for such a result and in the case of Tanzania it appears that: 
 
•  Before full import liberalization in Tanzania, aid was used to finance imported 
inputs to ease constraints to domestic production, helping to raise output 
through increased levels of capacity utilization (Nyoni 1998). This description 
is particularly relevant in the years following 1986 when the underground 
economy resurfaced generating a large supply response to the increased 
availability of goods (Mwase and Ndulu 2005).These factors are likely at 
work in the early years of the sample.  
 
•  As borne out in the ECM results and supported by the accounting exercise, it 
appears that the BoT, whether a result of fears of loss of competitiveness, as 
insurance against future aid inflow shortfalls, or a desire to target a specific 
prudential level of reserves is building gross reserves that is consistent with a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. This policy response to aid inflows 
seems particularly strong in recent years.  
 
Other important conclusions reached along the way to producing the results on the 
relationship between aid inflows and the REER are: 
 
•  The long-run cointegrating relationship indicates that, in addition to aid 
inflows, the terms of trade and trade liberalization exert a significant influence 
on the level of the REER. The REER appreciates (depreciates) with an 
improvement (decline) in the TOT and depreciates (appreciates) with a more 
open (closed) trade regime. 
 
•  Incorporating the parallel nominal exchange rate in the measure of 
Tanzanina’s REER is important when considering the historical evolution of 
the REER. Incorporating the parallel rate into the econometric analysis did not 
fundamentally change the results obtained with the official rate.  
 
 •  Relative to our estimates of the equilibrium REER, Tanzania’s actual REER 
was undervalued for much of the 1970s, sharply overvalued in the run-up to 
the balance of payments crises in 1986 and has recently been near 
equilibrium.  
 
•  Using an error correction model to capture the short-run dynamics of the 
REER indicates that it takes slightly less than 2 years for the REER to return 
halfway to its equilibrium value.  
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  32Annex 1. 
 
I. The Real Effective Exchange Rate in Tanzania: Concepts and Issues 
 
This annex discusses key concepts and issues that arise when measuring the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) in a low-income country (LIC) like Tanzania. It explores 
the concepts of the external real exchange rate and the internal real exchange rate and 
documents the data issues involved in constructing indices to measure both. The section 
first considers a two-country world to highlight the real component of the REER. It is 
followed by a discussion that considers the construction of an REER index in a multi-
country world and thereby focuses on the effective component of the REER. 
 
i)  The real component of the REER 
 
A country’s bilateral real exchange rate is typically defined as the product of the 
nominal exchange rate and the relative price levels between the two countries. It is a 
broad summary measure of the prices of one country’s goods and services relative those 
of another country or group of countries. In a small-open economy the real exchange rate 
may be its most important relative price measure and may be used as a key indicator of 
the economy’s external competitiveness. For example, an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate may reflect an increase in the domestic cost of producing goods implying 
that a country is now producing goods less efficiently than before, relative to the rest of 
the world. Defining the real exchange in these terms gives the external real exchange rate 
and derives from purchasing power parity (PPP) theory.  
 
Relative PPP holds that the nominal exchange rate is proportional to the ratio of 
domestic and foreign price levels as in equation one:
27  
 
















   is the nominal exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency.   and   are the domestic and foreign price levels respectively and   
is the real exchange rate, which in this formulation is a constant. If relative PPP does not 
hold for all goods in the domestic and foreign price levels then the real exchange is not a 
constant and any movements in the RER represent deviations from relative PPP. In this 
case, the real exchange rate is given by equation two: 
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27 Absolute PPP states that the real exchange rate should be constant and equal to one. 
  33In practice, the home and foreign price levels are measured by respective consumer 
price indices (CPI).
28 CPI measures cover the price of both traded and non traded goods 
and they can diverge significantly if productivity growth in both sectors differs.
29 In such 
circumstances, the real exchange rate may be better measured using a tradables price 
index, which is typically proxied for by relative wholesale price indices (WPI) or 
producer price indices (PPI) in both the home and foreign country. This measure may be 
appropriate when considering the relative price that achieves external balance in the trade 
in goods and services and would be a better measure to use if the aim is to better 
understand a country’s external competitiveness. However, an important drawback with 
these measures is that there is considerable variation in the composition of the price 
baskets across countries, making implications for competitiveness less clear if the relative 
prices of different products are being compared. The use of export price indices in both 
the home and foreign country is also an option, but they are even more liable to 
compositional differences, especially in low incomes countries where commodity prices 
make up a large share of the export price index. 
30 
 
The distinction between the price of tradables and nontradables is not only an 
important measurement issue, it underpins a second strand of real exchange rate indices 
which are based on real trade theory in the context of open economy macroeconomic 
models.
31 In these models the relative domestic price of non-traded to traded goods 
within the country is the real exchange rate and the increase in the relative price of non-
traded goods is a real exchange rate appreciation. This result gives rise to the concept 
the internal real exchange rate, which is the relative price that achieves internal balance
in the domestic supply and demand of nontraded and traded goods. It captures the 
internal relative price incentives in an economy for producing or consuming trad




                                                
 
The internal real exchange rate is the more appropriate measure of competitiveness in 
low income countries where international market share (i.e. external competitiveness) in 
the face of given international prices is a question of domestic price incentives and 
profitability in the production of tradables in the home country alone. If a country is a 
price taker in world markets then that country’s goods are either competitive at the 
prevailing world price or they are not. If they are, internal competitiveness is what 
matters, i.e., that domestic producers have an incentive to produce tradable goods over 
nontradables. In this context, internal and external competitiveness are one and the same 
and the internal real exchange rate is functionally proportional to the external real 
exchange rate.  
 
 
28 GDP deflators may also be used to measure home and foreign prices and are theoretically supported by 
the Mundell-Fleming open economy model. See Hinkle and Nsengiyumva 1999.  
29 The problem is magnified the heavier is the weight of nontraded goods such as consumer services in the 
CPI basket. 
30 Please see Harberger (2005) for a critique of these so-called ‘symmetric’ measures of the real exchange 
rate.  
31 These measures of the real exchange rate are supported by the two-sector dependent economy framework 
developed by Salter (1959) and Swan (1960) and used by Van Wijnbergen (1985), Edwards 1989) and 
Elbadawi (1994).  
  34The relationship between the external and internal real exchange rate can be 
expressed as a function of the relative price of tradables between the home country and 
the foreign counterpart, the relative price of nontradables in the home country, and the 
relative price of nontradables in the foreign country. Assuming that PPP holds for 
tradables, equation three defines the real exchange rate as the relative price of 
nontradables between the two countries. 
 














N = nontradables 
T= tradables  
α = weight of nontradables in home country aggregate price 
index 
a = weight of nontradables in the foreign country in aggregate 
price index.  
 
If the relative price of nontradables in the foreign country is unchanging then 
movements in the home country’s real exchange rate is a function of its own relative 
price of nontradables. Introducing the nominal exchange rate requires assuming that PPP 
holds in tradables so that the domestic currency price of tradables is equal to the foreign 
currency price of tradables multiplied by the nominal exchange rate. Assuming PPP in 
this instance restates the above, i.e, that the LIC is a price taker in world markets. 
Equation four is a special case of equation three and a measure of the home country’s 
internal real exchange rate:   
 





E RER =  
 
 
In principle, the domestic price indices of tradables and nontradables should be used 
to construct the internal RER, but these series are typically not available in LICs. In 
practice, the internal real exchange rate is measured using the foreign WPI and the 
domestic CPI. The foreign WPI multilplied by the nominal exchange rate proxies the 
home country’s tradable goods price, while the domestic CPI is a proxy for nontradable 
prices in the home economy.
 32 A key drawback in using the CPI as a proxy for 
nontradables prices is that the greater the weight of traded goods in the CPI implies a 
greater divergence in the proxy to nontraded goods prices. An important drawback in 
using foreign WPI is that it is unlikely to track fluctuations in a LIC’s exports prices, 
especially commodity prices. It may, however, do better tracking import prices and 
nontraditional exports. Additionally, the WPI measure will be a poor proxy for tradable 
                                                 
32 One direct measure includes using expenditure data from nation accounts to measure the ratio of 
domestic prices of goods actually exported and imported and the price of domestically produced and 
consumed goods (Devarajan, Lewis and Robinson 1993). Another direct measure attempts to split sectors 
of production into tradable and nontradable categories and then calculate implicit price deflators.  
  35prices if the ratio of export to import prices (terms of trade) are volatile. One alternative 
is to calculate a domestic tradables price index by taking a weighted average of the 
foreign price of importables ( )and exportables( ) multiplied by the nominal 
exchange rate as in  equation five.  
Md P Xd P
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;where α is the share of importables in total tradables. 
 
This measure of the internal real exchange rate implicitly assumes that import prices 
and export prices move together so that they can be aggregated into one tradable goods 
price. If the price of imports and export diverge then the measure will be less likely to 
appropriately capture the price incentives of producing or consuming tradables. In this 
case, it may be more appropriate to consider separate internal RER indices, one using 
exports prices and the other using import prices. In this way, the incentives in the 
exportable or the import-substituting sectors are better represented by the separate 
indices. We consider all three measures of the internal real exchange rate in the following 
section.  
   
An alternative approach to measuring the real exchange departs from the focus on 
international price competitiveness and instead considers international cost 
competitiveness. Relative unit labour cost indices are often used as indicators of 
international competitiveness as they provide a broad measure of the domestic costs of 
production. Labour is the relatively immobile factor in a country’s production process, 
implying labour costs are likely to diverge across countries and play a disproportionately 
important role in competitiveness. Defined in this way, the real exchange rate reflects the 
incentives to reallocate non-labour resources internationally and domestically. Unit 
labour costs are subject to significant measurement error and are published with long lags 
even in OECD countries. These drawbacks preventive us from measuring Tanzania’s real 
exchange rate using unit labour cost indices.  
 
ii)  The effective component of the REER 
 
Moving beyond a two-country framework necessitates consideration of the range of 
trading partners to include in the real exchange rate index and how they should be 
weighted. In principle, a country’s REER measure should include all trading partners that 
compete with domestic producers either directly or indirectly through third markets. In 
practice, data limitations in availability and quality tend to restrict the number of 
countries that can be considered. As long as a significant majority of a country’s trade is 
accounted for in the partners chosen, the impact on the REER index due to excluded 
partners should be marginal.  
 
There are two key issues that must be addressed when choosing a weighting scheme. 
The first is choosing the appropriate weights, either export weights, import weights, or 
both. This choice is clearly dependent on the choice of RER that is used. If separate 
internal RERs for export and import prices are used then weights should be export and 
  36imports, respectively. If the composite measure described in equation 5 is used then both 
export and imports or total trade flows should be used, given that external 
competitiveness consists of both export and import competitiveness.
33 In practice, the 
weight capturing the trade flows between the home country and country i is equal to the 
sum of imports and exports to country i as a proportion of the home country’s total trade 
flows. Bilateral trade weights of this sort fail to capture indirect competition from trading 
partners in third markets, thereby understating the degree of competition faced by 
domestic producers. REER indices calculated using weights to capture third party 
competition have been found to have significant impacts on the measures.
34 However, in 
countries where primary commodity exports make up a large share of total trade, third 
party competition may not be a serious issue given the lack of substitutability across 
countries of most primary commodities. Nevertheless, the IMF’s Total Competitiveness 
Weights (TCW) attempt to capture competition from third countries and is a feature of 
the IMF’s REER index for Tanzania shown in the next section.  
 
The second issue concerns the choice between fixed or flexible weights over time. 
Fixing the trade weights in a particular year is frequently done because it is easy to do. 
However, as trading patterns change over time the real exchange rate index may provide 
a misleading picture of the net effect of movements in particular bilateral exchange rates, 
and thereby competitiveness. In this context, it may be worthwhile to have the trade 
weights change over time. The weights can be changed continuously or at somewhat 
frequent discrete intervals depending on how the country’s trading partners have changed 
over time. Tanzania’s trading partners have indeed changed quite significantly over time 
(Table 1) suggesting that a flexible weighting scheme is in order. We discuss the 
implications of different weighting schemes on Tanzania’s REER in the next section. 
                                                 
33 An import competitiveness indicator measures a country’s competitive position in its home market, while 
an indicator of export competitiveness measures a country’s competitive position in its export markets.  
34 Please see Ghose, Devajyoti and Kharas, Homi. (1993). ‘International competitiveness, the demand for 
exports and real effective exchange rates in developing countries’. Journal of Development Economics 41, 
pp. 377-398.  
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Table A1: Trading Share for Major Trading Partners (%) 
Trading  Partners  1975 1985 1995 2000 2005 
United  Kingdom  12.7  14.4 8.0 11.3 4.2 
United  States  10.2  3.2 3.8 3.3 2.9 
China  7.7 1.3 3.6 3.1  10.1 
Germany  7.5 12.7 5.0  5.3  3.9 
Saudi  Arabia  7.2 2.8 3.7 2.6 2.2 
Kenya  6.4 1.6  10.5  5.8 6.4 
Japan  4.4 8.4 7.1 7.9 3.6 
Italy  3.3 8.6 2.9 2.0 2.2 
India  3.0 1.5 5.4 8.3 7.4 
Netherlands  2.9 4.3 2.9 3.4 3.5 
Singapore  2.7 2.0 2.5 0.6 0.4 
Sweden  2.2 2.8 1.3 0.8 1.8 
Belgium  2.1 3.0 2.1 1.5 1.5 
Denmark  2.0 2.1 1.1 1.1 0.2 
South  Africa  0.0 0.0 7.8 8.5  10.3 
United  Arab  Emirates  0.0 2.1 3.2 2.8 5.5 
Other  trading  partners  25.6 29.0 29.0 31.7 33.7 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
      
 
iii)  Other issues in the LIC context  
 
In the LIC context, careful attention must be paid to the nominal exchange rate used 
in the calculation of the REER. Many LICs either have had or still have parallel markets 
for foreign exchange, where an exchange rate determined by the market (either legally or 
illegally) coexists with a pegged or managed exchange rate. Using the officially managed 
nominal exchange rate only in the calculation of an REER could be a misleading 
indicator of economy-wide price incentives in the LIC as the official rate is most times 
overvalued. Tanzania has had a parallel exchange rate for much of it post-independence 
history, with the parallel exchange premium peaking at over 700 percent in 1986. The 
parallel premium gradually declined to less than 10 percent 1993 and the exchange rates 
were unified in 1994 (see Chart 1). In the next section we present an REER using a 
weighted average of the parallel and official nominal exchange rates.
35   
 
                                                 
35 Jorgensen and Paldam (1986) justify the use of an average of the two rates on the basis that 
misalignments in the parallel and official rates tend to be in opposite directions (the parallel rate being 
undervalued while the official rate is overvalued) and policy shocks such as large devaluations often move 
the rates in opposite directions.  
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Related to the issue of the parallel market rate is the existence of unrecorded trade 
through unofficial markets. Such unrecorded trade is likely to be greater the higher are 
tariffs and nontariff barriers to official trade and the greater is the parallel market 
premium (Hinkle and Nsengiyumva 1999). It may also be the case that due to weak 
recording of trade data that unrecorded trade may be significant in the absence of a large 
parallel market premium. In either case, adjustments to the weighting schemes that are 
based on official direction of trade statistics may be necessary when constructing the 
REER in LICs. Adjustments can typically be made on the basis of specific country 
knowledge of unrecorded trade patterns. The next section shows how Tanzania’s REER 
is affected by making adjustments to the weighting scheme to account for simulated 
levels of unrecorded trade.  
 
Tariffs and administered price schemes that act as taxes or subsidies on imports or 
exports may cause domestic prices to diverge from border prices. When such tax or 
administered price effects are significant, they will affect the relationship between 
internal and external REERs and will not reflect the true internal price incentives to 
producing and consuming tradables. An increase in protection, other things being equal, 
will depreciate the internal REER by raising the domestic price of tradables and hence 
may partially offset an appreciation of the external REER. However, it is the internal 
RER inclusive of taxes that reflects relative domestic prices and affects domestic resource 
allocation. 
 
II. A comparison of alternative REERs for Tanzania 
 
i)  Alternative weighting schemes 
 
Table A2 shows the fixed weighting scheme used in the IMF’s measure of Tanzania’s 
REER and the weights used in our flexible weighting scheme. The IMF weights are fixed 
at the average of the 1989-1991 period and based on the 23 largest trading partners. Our 
weights are based on Tanzania’s 50 largest trading partners and change according to a 
  39five-year moving average. Our weights indicate significant differences relative to the 
IMF weights in the later years of the sample, where developing countries like Kenya and 
India take on greater weights in the weighting scheme. Also, the difference in country 
coverage appears to be significant and is increasing over time as indicated by growing 
weight on the other category in Table A2.  
 
Table A2: Comparing Weights 
Our Weights in Different Time Periods  Trading partner  IMF 
weights  1969~2005  1975 1985 1995 2005 
United Kingdom  16.1  15.4  17.1  14.4 10.0  7.2 
Germany  11.9  9.4  8.1  14.4 7.5  4.2 
Japan  11.2  8.0  6.3  9.2 7.9 6.5 
Italy  10.1  5.0  4.2  6.4 4.4 2.4 
United States  8.1  5.1  7.8  4.1 3.2 3.7 
Netherlands  5.5  4.6  3.5  5.9 3.6 3.7 
France  4.5  2.4  2.1  2.0 1.9 4.5 
Sweden  3.8  2.1  2.2  2.6 1.8 1.1 
Belgium  3.7  2.6  2.2  3.5 3.3 1.8 
India  2.8  5.3  4.3  2.7 5.9 7.8 
China  2.7  2.3  0.0  1.4 3.6 6.5 
Denmark  2.4  1.8  1.1  1.7 1.4 0.5 
Canada  2.4  1.3  1.7  1.2 0.7 1.4 
Kenya  1.9  4.8  9.5  1.1 6.7 5.8 
Switzerland  1.8  1.1  0.8  2.0 0.6 0.6 
Pakistan  1.8  1.1  0.4  0.3 1.7 0.9 
Brazil  1.7  0.3  0.0  0.4 0.3 0.2 
Finland  1.5  0.9  0.2  1.8 0.7 0.5 
Spain  1.4  0.6  0.5  0.4 0.6 1.4 
Australia  1.3  1.3  2.0  0.6 0.4 2.6 
Norway  1.2  0.7  0.4  0.7 0.7 0.2 
Singapore  1.2  1.9  1.5  1.7 2.5 0.6 
Korea, Rep.  1.2  0.4  0.0  0.0 0.8 0.9 
Other  0.0  21.9  24.0  21.5 30.1 34.8 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
Note: The twenty-three IMF trading partners are shown, while the remaining twenty-seven trading 
partners captured in the flexible weighting scheme are grouped in the other category.  
 
  Despite the differences in the two weighting schemes, using a flexible weighting 
scheme appears to have very little impact on measures of Tanzania’s REER. Figure 1 
shows the IMF’s REER and an index using the flexible weighting scheme described 
above.
36 Both measures virtually coincide, although the flexible weights measure does 
indicate greater volatility, especially from the 1990s. A closer look at the indices over the 
last fifteen years shows that the trends are the same: a 40 percent appreciation over the 
1990s (45 percent with flexible weights) followed by a 30 percent depreciation since the 
beginning of 2000 (27.4 percent). The correlation coefficient for the two indices is 0.97 
                                                 
36 An increase in the index corresponds to an appreciation of the REER. This presentation is consistent 
throughout the paper.  
  40over the period 1990-2004. The apparent insignificance of different weighting schemes 
on measures of Tanzania’s REER is not unexpected, as the relatively small changes in 
weights are dominated by changes in relative prices and or the nominal exchange rate 
(see Edwards 1989).  
 
  Adjusting the official trade weights to account for Tanzania’s unrecorded trade 
also has little impact on the REER measure. We tested the sensitivity of the REER index 
to unrecorded trade by increasing the trade value of Tanzania’s neighboring countries by 
five times throughout the entire sample period. While there is a marginal level shift in the 
index during the 1980s the trend is virtually identical. For the rest of the period, the 
indices virtually coincide. This is explained in part by the strong comovement in the 
bilateral nominal exchange rates between Tanzania and its neighbors and the shilling and 
other developed country exchange rates during the entire sample period. 
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The apparent insignificance of using different weighting schemes does not 
suggest that no weighting scheme is preferable. Tanzania is reliant on the export of 
primary products whose prices are determined in world markets and in major currencies. 
Arguably, bilateral real exchange rates with the pricing currencies are as strong an 
indicator of external competitiveness as a multilateral real exchange rate. Figure 3 shows 
that the TZA shilling/US dollar and the TZA shilling/UK pound real exchange rates have 
a correlation coefficient of 0.90 over the 1990-2004 period. The multilateral RER and the 
bilateral indices are slightly less correlated (REER-US dollar 0.85, REER-UK pound 
0.88, REER- SA Rand 0.88), indicating that a multilateral real exchange rate is a more 
robust (albeit marginally), measure of competitiveness in Tanzania.    
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ii)  Alternative price measures  
 
Figure 4 presents a number of indices measuring Tanzania’s REER using a variety of 
price indices. The first panel in Figure 4 shows ‘symmetric’ measures, i.e. using the same 
price indicator in the trading partner as in Tanzania. Conceptually, these indices derive 
from PPP theory and proxy the external real exchange rate. The second panel presents the 
‘asymmetric’ measures of the REER, which use price indices that proxy the prices of 
tradables and nontradables in Tanzania. The ‘asymmetric’ measures attempt to capture 
movements in the internal REER. One general observation is that all the REER measures 
show a strong tendency to move together implying that these measures of the internal and 
the external REER are closely related and seem to indicate an improvement in Tanzania’s 
competitiveness in recent years. Although, the ‘symmetric’ measure using the relative 
price of tradables (export and import prices) does not show as pronounced a depreciation 
in recent years. However, there are technical and conceptual reasons not to put too much 
stock in the relative price of tradables measure of Tanzania’s REER. As a primary 
product exporter and importer, Tanzania’s tradables price basket is quite different than 
the prices of the components contained in developed country tradable price baskets that 
are being measured (e.g. U.K, U.S. and Germany). It is not clear, for example, what the 
relative price of tea to autos tells us about Tanzania’s external competitiveness in the tea 
sector. 
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Figure A3. Tanzania: Real Effective Exchange Rate Measures  
Symmetric Price Measures
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Another observation of note regarding the ‘symmetric’ measures is the recent 
divergence between the CPI-based index and the GDP deflator-based index. The GDP 
deflator-based index indicates a somewhat less dramatic depreciation from 2001. When 
Tanzania’s external terms of trade (TOT) change significantly, movements in CPI (which 
includes the price of imports, but excludes the price of exports) and its GDP deflator 
(which includes the price of exports, but excludes the price of imports) may diverge. In 
recent years, the price of Tanzania’s exports have increased faster than import prices (a 
TOT improvement) and thus the GDP deflator has risen faster than CPI, thereby 
indicating a dampening of the improvement in competitiveness relative to the CPI-based 
REER measure.  
 
The ‘asymmetric’ measures, the measures of the REER that we find conceptually 
most relevant in the case of Tanzania, are collinear at 0.70. However, the measure using 
Tanzania’s export and import price indices does show more pronounced appreciations 
and depreciations. This can be explained by the more dramatic swings in Tanzania’s 
tradables prices than the changes in foreign country WPIs. Concerns about the quality 
and availability of Tanzania’s export and import price data lead us to construct an 
additional measure of the REER. Employing a modified methodology used by Cashin et 
al (2004), we construct a separate price index for Tanzania’s exports as a weighted 
average of its nine key commodity prices.
37 We combine this measure with foreign WPIs 
to proxy nontraditional export and import prices to report another measure of the REER. 
It also shows a strong correlation with the other indices (Figure 4).  
 
As discussed above and observed with the ‘symmetric’ REER measures, if export and 
import prices do not move together then aggregating them into one tradables price 
measure can give misleading signals of the price incentive to produce and consume 
tradables and by extension external competitiveness. It may be more informative to 
                                                 
37 The nine commodities are: coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, sisal, copper, spice, nut and fish. Overall, these 
nine commodities accounted for more than 50 to 75 per cent of total Tanzania non-gold exports over the 
sample period. Though gold accounted for about 50 per cent of Tanzania exports in 2004, the gold industry 
is an enclave and largely detached from the rest of economy, so gold prices are not included in the measure. 
  43separate the price of tradables into its export price component and its import price 
component to produce two measures of the internal REER. Again, this distinction does 
not alter general conclusions and magnitudes of the changes in the other measures of the 
REER. Although, the commodity price based export price index shows a sharp 
appreciation during 2004 not seen in the WPI-based measure, which reflects strong fish 
price increases in 2004.  
 
      Figure A4. Tanzania: Real Effective Exchange Rate Measures  
Real Effective Exchange Rate for Tanzania (2000=100)
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iii)  Incorporating the parallel exchange rate market  
 
Accounting for the parallel nominal exchange rate in the calculation of Tanzania’s 
real exchange rate is a particular concern given the large parallel market premiums that 
have existed in the past (see Section I).  While the parallel market premium has 
disappeared since 1994, understanding current REER level in a historical context 
necessitates inclusion of the parallel exchange rate. A complicating factor, however, is 
that when combining the parallel and official rates in one measure of the nominal 
exchange rate it is necessary to have some information on the share of transactions in the 
parallel market. We take a weighted average of the official and parallel rates by assuming 
that the share of transactions in the parallel market is 80 percent when parallel premium 
is highest and the share of parallel market trade decline proportionally with (square root 
of) parallel premium. While somewhat arbitrary, this definition is based on discussions 
with Bank of Tanzania officials. Incorporating the parallel market rate in this way 
indicates that while there has been a depreciation of the REER in the last 5 years its 
current level is still appreciated relative to 1990 levels (Figure 5). The heavier the weight 
that is placed on unrecorded trade the more pronounced the appreciation would become 
and the stronger the upward trend observed.  
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Figure 6. Tanzania: Real Effective Exchange Rate Measures 
Official and Parallel Nominal Exchange Rates  
Full Sample (1969-2005)
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A3. Unit Root Test 






   Level 
First 
Difference Level First  Difference 
Log( WPI-based REER)  -1.965(1)  -3.355(0)**  -1.583  -3.393** 
Log(REER incorporating parallel rate)  -1.597(1)  -6.323(0)**  -1.886  -6.302** 
Log(openness) -2.262(0)  -5.633(0)***  -2.303  -5.645*** 
Log (real commodity price)  -1.233(0)  -6.602(0)***  -1.088  --6.767*** 
Log(Public Investment)  -2.550(0)  -5.916(0)***  -1.929  -5.921*** 
Log(Relative Per Cap GDP)  -1.240(0)  -5.853(0)***  1.209  -5.795*** 
Log(aid/GDP) -2.409(0)  -6.232(0)***  -2.379  -6.300*** 
              
Note: In paranthese are numbers of lags       
* significant at 10%          
** signficant at 5%         




  45 
Annex 3. 
Table A4. Central Government Operation 1995-2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Levels (Billions of Tza shilling)
Net Financing 79.20 12.50 18.75 158.80 325.10 344.95 320.45 522.05 836.79 1203.08 1562.00
  Net Aid 21.75 46.90 117.95 175.35 288.40 346.70 386.75 613.20 935.90 1226.67 1433.47
  Net Domestic Financing 31.55 -36.05 -88.85 -60.45 -60.25 -76.30 -83.75 -90.25 -99.01 -23.58 111.88
  Other 25.90 1.65 -10.35 43.90 97.00 74.60 17.45 -0.95 -0.15 0.00 16.65
Balance (before grants) -79.20 -12.50 -18.75 -158.80 -325.10 -344.95 -320.45 -522.05 -836.79 -1203.08 -1562.00
  Revenue 389.79 510.20 595.58 654.30 731.00 851.05 986.25 1130.20 1338.40 1599.30 1949.28
  Expenditure (excl. interest) 440.80 505.51 610.22 809.20 1035.25 1165.75 1293.70 1645.25 2154.68 2762.36 3511.276
       Development Expenditure 103.70 115.85 153.85 222.65 321.60 340.80 288.80 396.10 571.70 867.04 1079.97
Percent of GDP
Net Financing 2.62 0.33 0.40 2.85 5.05 4.75 3.87 5.53 7.83 9.76 11.42
  Net Aid 0.72 1.24 2.51 3.15 4.48 4.77 4.67 6.49 8.76 9.96 10.48
  Net Domestic Financing 1.04 -0.96 -1.89 -1.08 -0.94 -1.05 -1.01 -0.96 -0.93 -0.19 0.82
  Other 0.86 0.04 -0.22 0.79 1.51 1.03 0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12
Balance (before grants) -2.62 -0.33 -0.40 -2.85 -5.05 -4.75 -3.87 -5.53 -7.83 -9.76 -11.42
  Revenue 12.90 13.54 12.66 11.74 11.36 11.71 11.92 11.97 12.52 12.98 14.26
  Expenditure (excl interest) 14.59 13.42 12.97 14.52 16.09 16.04 15.64 17.42 20.16 22.42 25.68
       Development Expenditure 3.43 3.07 3.27 4.00 5.00 4.69 3.49 4.19 5.35 7.04 7.90
Changes (Billions of Tza shilling)
∆ Net Financing -66.70 6.25 140.05 166.30 19.85 -24.50 201.60 314.74 366.29 358.92
  ∆ Net Aid 25.15 71.05 57.40 113.05 58.30 40.05 226.45 322.70 290.76 206.80
  ∆ Net Domestic Financing -67.60 -52.80 28.40 0.20 -16.05 -7.45 -6.50 -8.76 75.43 135.46
  ∆ Other -24.25 -12.00 54.25 53.10 -22.40 -57.15 -18.40 0.80 0.15 16.65
∆ Balance (before grants) 66.70 -6.25 -140.05 -166.30 -19.85 24.50 -201.60 -314.74 -366.29 -358.92
  ∆ Revenue 120.41 85.38 58.72 76.70 120.05 135.20 143.95 208.20 260.89 349.98
  ∆ Expenditure (excl. interest) 64.72 104.71 198.99 226.05 130.50 127.95 351.55 509.43 607.68 748.92
       ∆ Development Expenditure 12.15 38.00 68.80 98.95 19.20 -52.00 107.30 175.60 295.35 212.93
Changes (% of GDP)
∆ Financing   -2.29 0.07 2.45 2.20 -0.31 -0.87 1.65 2.30 1.93 1.66
  ∆ Net Aid   0.52 1.26 0.64 1.34 0.29 -0.10 1.82 2.27 1.20 0.53
  ∆ Net Domestic Financing   -2.00 -0.93 0.80 0.15 -0.11 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.74 1.01
  ∆ Other   -0.81 -0.26 1.01 0.72 -0.48 -0.82 -0.22 0.01 0.00 0.12  
∆ Balance (before grants)   2.29 -0.07 -2.45 -2.20 0.31 0.87 -1.65 -2.30 -1.93 -1.66
  ∆ Revenue   0.64 -0.88 -0.92 -0.38 0.35 0.21 0.05 0.56 0.46 1.28
  ∆ Expenditure (excl. interest)   -1.18 -0.44 1.55 1.57 -0.05 -0.41 1.78 2.74 2.26 3.26
       ∆ Development Expenditure   -0.36 0.20 0.73 1.00 -0.31 -1.20 0.70 1.16 1.69 0.86
Source: IMF Staff Reports
1995-1999
Years of  REER Appreciation Years of REER Depreciation
2000-2005
 
 